The politics of press freedom and the national economy in Swaziland

The government of Swaziland like many others in Africa has declared many times that the Swazi press is free with no attempt to gag or intimidate journalists. However, there has never been a specific free press clause in the Swazi constitution. In the 1968 constitution (since repealed) the freedom of expression provision was couched in the overall fundamental rights and freedom of the individual clause:

Whereas every person in Swaziland is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedom of the individual that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following namely: a) life, liberty, security of person and protection of the law; b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; and c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation (Swaziland Constitution 1968, Ch.2).

At the moment, Swaziland does not have a constitution. It is in the process of putting one together. But so far there is no indication that any new constitution would contain any press freedom clause. This is an important element in the politics of press freedom in the country.

In the first place, the Constitution Review Commission (CRC), a body charged with putting together a new constitution, is now busy gathering submissions from the public. However it is having its hearing ‘in camera’ - with the media barred. In effect, it is difficult to know what individual submissions there are and to discuss them openly.

Secondly, no groups are allowed to make submissions as a body. Thus journalists cannot make a collective submission to protect any particular professional interest. They are to come as individuals and as such can not ‘collectively bargain’, as it were. In reaction to this policy, journalists - both as individuals and as a professional body have largely ignored the commission - a sort of boycott. So right from the start, a seed of mutual distrust is being sown.

The decision not to allow bodies make submissions was obviously not derived from public opinion, but rather from the whims of members of the commission probably out of fear that a ‘united’ submission would be more difficult to ignore or dismiss. Thus some scheming even in the shaping of a new constitution that is supposed to create the environment for the freedom of expression and, therefore, of the press, is already evident.

In response to the situation, a South African journalist and former chairman of the South African Black Editors Forum, Joe Thloloe, called on Swazi journalists to draft their own freedom of expression and media freedom clauses they want to have in a new constitution. In this way, he argued, Swazi citizens would have alternatives to debate and would, hopefully, be allowed to choose what they think is best for the country (Thloloe, 2000).

Two stories about press freedom

Apart from the constitution drafting issue, two events have recently highlighted the politics of press freedom in Swaziland. They are the Swaziland Media Council Bill and the Liphovela story.

In 1997, the government drafted a Media Council Bill. Obviously an attempt to rein in a press that has been perceived as becoming steadily ‘irresponsible’, the Bill was enacted by the King and parliament of Swaziland ostensibly to promote ‘responsible standards of journalism’. Among other things the Bill sought to establish a Swaziland media council, composed mainly of non-journalists (only 2 out of 7 are to be journalists).

The functions of the council include:

∑ promotion of a responsible standard of journalism and press freedom.
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∑ advancing the highest professional and ethical standards for journalists.
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∑ ensuring the protection of the rights and privileges of journalists in the lawful performance of their lawful duties.
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∑ inquiring into and considering allegations of conduct which is contrary to the code and the profession of journalist.
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∑ receiving, inquiring into and considering complaints from any affected person, the government or another journalist that a publication contravenes the code of professional ethics of a journalist.
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∑ advising on and recommending to the Minister review of the code and media policy.
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∑ accrediting and registering local and foreign journalists.
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∑ disciplining journalists and publications found to have contravened the code or professional ethics of journalists.
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∑ supervising the practice and the profession of journalism.
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Most of these functions would obviously best be carried out by journalists themselves, yet less than one third of the proposed council are supposed to be journalists.

The very idea of a government derived Media Council Bill drew the ire of Swaziland journalists and they reacted accordingly. At parliamentary hearings on the bill, journalists and other stakeholders condemned the Bill in its entirety, rejecting in particular the fact that it is a ‘government council’ rather than a ‘media council’ that ought to be controlled by media practitioners. The whole idea of the Bill was seen as a government design to muzzle the press and establish what would amount to government-say-so journalism. Condemnation came from various quarters.

The Swaziland National Association of Journalists (SNAJ) rejected the Bill entirely, noting that it portrayed Swaziland government as ‘intolerant and totalitarian, as an abuser of human rights, as a paternal censoring authority’ (Select Committee Report 197). The association pointed out that their foreign counterparts were concerned about censoring of the press in Swaziland and were therefore spearheading the drive for sanctions on the country.

The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) criticized the Bill as a violation of the Windhoek Declaration on the establishment of an independent and pluralistic African press and that the whole exercise was done in bad faith. The institute condemned the Bill as a ‘draconian piece of legislation that seeks to impose totalitarian control on the practice of journalism in Swaziland’ (ibid).

The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) dismissed the Bill as ‘introducing jungle justice and kangaroo tribunal to deal with violators of its objectives which are themselves a gross violation of fundamental rights and bypassing the usage of normal judicial system.’ More importantly, the union noted that a further repercussion of the Bill would include loss of jobs for workers; the subjection of the public to a culture of silence and to indoctrination; the undermining of the dispensation process and the closure of some media houses and publishing companies which would lead to an exodus of investors’ (ibid).

Most of the other contributions to the discussion of the Media Council Bill were in the same vein as above - dismissing the idea as mere politics. The debate and discussion of the Bill raged on the pages of newspapers for quite some time and attracted a lot of international attention.

The king’s new wife

The politics of The Media Council Bill was obvious. However, the most serious political challenge to press freedom in the country was in the liphovela issue. At the 1999 Reed Dance (an annual traditional national ritual), the King (and Head of State) as is customary, picked one of the maidens as a possible future bride. The young girl becomes a fiancée (liphovela) and possibly a wife later. The young girl chosen that year was put under the searchlight by the editor of the Sunday edition of the Times of Swaziland, Bheki Makhubu. The resulting story was to the effect that the young girl was a high school drop-out, a truant and generally a ‘naughty girl’. The story noted that the girl lacked discipline and was kicked out of two schools in two years.

This story raised a lot of dust in the nation. It was condemned by many traditionalists and loyalists as being in bad taste and serving only to damage the girl’s reputation and that of the royal household. Some others even saw it as a way of getting at the King. Yet others thought the media had no business whatsoever revealing such details about the liphovela - no matter how true.

But the editor defended the publication as an accurate story and of interest to the nation. The people had a right to know what their leader was getting into and the background of a possible future queen. The ability to write about such issues would be the quintessence of press freedom. The story sparked one of the hottest public discourses in Swaziland.

At first, the Times of Swaziland management published an editorial in support of Makhubu’s work. But soon after it did an about-turn and backed down, obviously under pressure from political and national authorities. And even before the dust had settled, Makhubu had lost his job. Worse still, he was arrested and charged with criminal defamation. The case is still in court, but in an interesting twist, the Chief Justice, before whom Makhubu appeared chastised the state for ‘wielding big guns for small flies’. He was saying in effect that the case was not as serious as the state was making it out to be. He argued that if the King’s fiancée felt aggrieved, she could file a law suite against Makhubu.

The judge’s observation was a victory of sort for journalism. However, the whole saga underlined the extent to which freedom of the press could be politicized. It exposed the ease with which journalists could be intimidated - making journalists reluctant to tackle serious issues since management would dump them once they draw the ire of authorities in the country.

Restriction and suppression

The liphovela story and the media council bill debate generated a lot of interest in foreign media. The issues were carried in the South African Press, the BBC, VOA and similar networks. Comments in these media mostly expressed concern about the suppression of freedom of expression in the country.

In a place like Swaziland, the media can be subjected to two types of government control: coercive and manipulative (as was the case in South Africa before democratic rule). Coercion includes legislation that determines who may publish and what may be published, as well as less direct measures such as intimidating the press into self-censorship. Manipulative control comprises the extensive state machinery used both to suppress unfavourable information and to promote a positive image of official policies at home and abroad. These two modes of control appear evident in the two issues above.

Generally when there is restriction and suppression, the press either tends to go underground, toes the government line or strives to act as counterpoise to government. The size of the country and the nature of Swazi society would not provide a conducive environment for the operation of an underground press. Not only would the clientele for such a press be hard to establish, there would be nowhere for the press to hide even if it goes ahead to function. Therefore, the only other option left in the face of perceived government restriction, outside of joining the government, is to play an adversarial role and to act as counterpoise to government. Unfortunately the responsibility for playing such a role can only fall on very few shoulders.

First of all, the electronic media in the country - radio and television - are a monopoly of government. The journalists there are essentially civil servants and must function as such. The other station that broadcasts from Swaziland is Trans World Radio (TWR), a Christian entity that steers clear of political issues. Similarly, another radio outfit, the Christian Media Centre, is primarily concerned with the production of Christian programmes. Both have no impact on the political scene and their attention to the social scene is often limited to areas of morality.

The country has two newspapers - The Times of Swaziland and The Swazi Observer. The Times which is privately owned has been in existence for about a century. The Observer is, strictly speaking, not a government newspaper. However, it is owned by the Tibiyo Trust whose head is the King. It is therefore generally perceived as a pro-government newspaper. It tends to exercise a lot of self-restraint when dealing with national issues whereas the Times is usually more outspoken and less reluctant to be confrontational.

It is, therefore, the Times that has tried to play the adversarial role and counterpoise to government. It allows its pages to be used as a forum for the expose and discussion of controversial issues. For instance, in 1997 and 1998, the Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT) was at loggerheads with government regarding pay and other conditions of service. State of tension and insecurity prevailed as teachers went on strike and marched all over the country. Concerned about what this would do to the country’s image, government decided to reduce the amount of visibility SNAT was receiving in the media. SNAT claimed that government issued instructions to the electronic media not to give access to its officials. Although government denied this, the reality seemed to bear SNAT out. There was an obvious news blackout on the association and its activities except for pro-government news on the crisis.

This must be seen against the background that Swaziland often promotes an image of a homogenous, peaceful and beautiful country. Such disruption runs counter to the image. The incident cast some doubt not only on the quality of education in Swaziland but on the claim to peace and security.

At about the same period, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) had organized stay-away strike actions over a series of demands for workers. There was a protracted confrontation with government that disrupted several services in the country. Although there was a tacit appeal by government to the country’s media not to give prominence to the disruptive labour activities, the print media in exercise of their freedom and in pursuit of the principle of objectivity gave the events maximum publicity. It was almost like an act of defiance.

Then there are the radical ‘progressive’ associations in the country (officially banned) who are fundamentally opposed to the nature of state governance. The two most prominent of these associations are the Swazi Youth Congress (SWAYOCO) and the People United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO). They have consistently attacked the country’s Tinkhundla system as undemocratic and anachronistic, and want it abolished. The Tinkhundla is the system in which the country is divided into traditional centres where the people supposedly meet periodically to discuss issues of community interest and transmit their ideas to government. Through the system, the transmission of information from the King to his subjects is supposed to be improved and self-development encouraged and promoted. The Tinkhundla creates the foundation for the monarchial system of governance in Swaziland in which the King is the Head of State - although he is advised by a cabinet headed by the Prime Minister.

These ‘progressive’ groups are opposed to what they refer to as an anachronism that is against the basic principles of modern democracy and fosters authoritarianism. They argue that the system discourages freedom of expression and limits the people’s contribution to policy decision making. They vent their discontent usually on the pages of the print media notably the Times. And the world outside picks up all of these pieces of information about continued discontent in Swaziland.

Critical media

Then in 1998 and 1999 there were two bomb explosions - one destroying the office of the Deputy Prime Minister (the headquarters of the Tinkhundla) in 1998 and the other destroying one of the Tinkhundla in Mahlanya. Both were blamed on the ‘progressives’ who, of course, denied them, and refused to be intimidated. On the contrary, they have intensified their attack on the country’s political system and have used every opportunity at home and abroad to demonstrate against the government and state of affairs in the country. All of these activities are often publicized in the country’s print media. Such publicity has tended to create a poor image for the Swazi government abroad. The scathing attacks on governance are given prominence in the Times. It is arguable whether the Times publicizes these activities of ‘progressives’ out of spite for the government or simply a pursuit of the principles of objectivity and fair-play. However, when one looks at some news analysis and commentaries on national issues in the Times, there would be the tendency to assume the former.

In the Times weekly column, ‘As I See it’ there is a lot of vituperation against the government and government officials. The columnist Vusie Ginindza spares no words, no matter how harsh, to criticize government officials and parliamentarians as well as princes who are seen to belong to a special class in the society. In several of these columns he had clearly referred to cabinet members (by name) as rogues and corrupt. He accused the Minister of Finance of openly appropriating government land and distributing it to family and cohorts. He has accused government of incompetence and lacking a sense of direction. He has attacked the powerful princes of emptiness and lacking in moral authority to lay any claim to leadership positions in the country (and this is in a country where princes are almost untouchables).

In many swipes at government and its functionaries, Vusie Ginindza exposed a lot of inadequacies in governance in the country. When all of this is added to continueds attack on government by the radical groups which enjoy a lot of media visibility, a picture emerges of an environment that is not conducive to (foreign) investment. Since the Swazi Observer and the government controlled broadcast media concern themselves essentially with mundane issues, steering clear of serious and controversial issues, the Times would be the logical choice for information gathering by potential investors.

Impact on economic growth

Swaziland is a very small country of less than one million people with a total land area of just about 17,500 square kilometres. One vital characteristic of Swaziland is the almost total absence of cultural, religious or linguistic divisions. There is only one language, one culture and the homogeneity plus a strong traditional underpinning have, for long, combined to make the country easy to govern and presents a picture of a quiet, peaceful, stable and secure environment, attractive to investors.

The King, as Head of State, makes a number of overseas trips each year to woo investors. But the dividends from these trips are hardly ever significant. The picture that the King presents to the outside world hardly coincides with the picture created by the press. The differential interpretations of political philosophies and activities among groups in the country or between the government and the governed leads to a climate of fear that is felt outside. Indeed the activities of the ‘progressive’ groups such as SWAYOCO and PUDEMO, published in the media have contributed to this climate of fear.

Swaziland needs a lot of foreign investment for the economy to grow. The structure of the Swazi economy at independence was that of a high degree of openness, significant economic progress with high rates of real growth in GDP and exports and a close linkage to the South African economy. The main areas of linkages include trade (over 80% of the imports from, and about 50% of the exports to South Africa); employment (over 15,000 persons in South African mines); transport and communications; and investment and energy (70% of electricity imported from South Africa). Another area of linkage is the Common Monetary Area (CMA) consisting of Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) arrangement (Akinkugbe, 1997: 240-2).

Swaziland enjoyed a high rate of economic growth in the 1980s mainly because of the sanctions against apartheid South Africa that forced many investors to move to Swaziland But with the end of apartheid and the lifting of sanctions against South Africa, the tables seemed to turn against Swaziland. It lost its previous advantage as a ‘next-door’ investment alternative to South Africa. The economy has stagnated and is worrisome. To make matters worse, there are imminent changes in the SACU agreement and changes in the level and structure of the Customs Union tariffs which are likely to result in declines in SACU receipts (Akinkugbe, 1997: 241).

Two things are apparent here. First, most of Swazi economy so far is dependent on South Africa. Now, with democracy restored in South Africa, its continued economic relations with Swaziland may be determined and influenced by South Africa’s perception of the degree of democratization in Swaziland. If the indicators available to South Africa are that the democratization process is slow or deliberately hampered by government or quasi-government forces, then it may decide to pull some economic plugs to force reform.

South Africa will be influenced in its decision by the kind of news that comes out from Swaziland that are easily available in South Africa’s media. Furthermore, South Africa’s body of trade unions (COSATU) has never disguised its sympathy and support for its counterpart in Swaziland (SFTU) and the other ‘progressive’ bodies and their activities aimed at political reforms. COSATU is quite influential in South Africa and is capable of bringing all kinds of pressure to bear on the government to tighten the economic screw on Swaziland. Given the heavy dependence of Swaziland on South Africa, severing any strand of the economic ties could be damaging for Swaziland. Furthermore, the nature of changes in the level and structure of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) may be directly or indirectly affected by the various countries political environment and how compatible they appear to be.

A second scenario for Swaziland is that investment which came in the 1980s almost on a platter, will now have to be worked for. The King’s many trips overseas in search of investors will come to nothing if there is any dissonance in the minds of the potential investors regarding the investment climate in the country. The media play a crucial role in establishing this climate. Attempts at controlling parameters of (political) debate have serious consequences here. Form and substance - and comparative freedom of public communication will be influenced by political news.

Policy implications

Government and the media-especially the independent media - do not appear to be working in concert towards development. The patron-client relationship that seems to exist between them has elicited some degree of resentment on the part of the press that has manifested itself in the kind of confrontational stance taken by the press over the past couple of years. The journalists write as if to dare the government. This is unhealthy for the country in its dysfunctional consequences.

Also, the very slow pace of democratization is helping to push to the fore the disruptive activities of organized resistance groups, which receive more than adequate publicity in the media and suggest an unhealthy environment in which to do business. The government cannot continue to bury its head in the sand and proclaim that all is well. Nobody seems to be listening to that. It has to be more proactive in dealing with the situation. First, there has to be a sense of direction for communication interaction in the country. Government and all stake-holders must come together to discuss and agree on a framework that will allow everyone work towards the same goal through popularly prescribed channels and modes.

A national communication policy would provide such a framework. It creates an environment in which the different parts of the communication process in the country can function in concert. Such a policy identifies the communication goals of a nation and prescribes ways of attaining them. It comes about as a national consensus. It then ascribes roles to different bodies in the society who can contribute to the attainment of the set goals. More importantly, it acts as a guideline for communication relationship between government and the press to avoid the perpetual movement on a collusion course by both parties. It eliminates, to an appreciable degree, the mutual suspicion between government and the press and dampens the latter’s zeal to be defiant.

Swaziland does not have a national communication policy. It is now imperative to have one. There had been moves in this direction. In 1992 a consultative meeting was held in the country to try and formulate a communication policy for the country. Nothing has come of it yet. Government must now look into it seriously as a matter of policy.

Secondly, an important source of the poor image that Swaziland has is the publicized activities of the various radical groups. They are opposed to the country’s mode of governance, and are doing all they can to bring about reform. They claim they are interested only in the democratization of the system. Government for its part claims that it is running a democracy. There is therefore a problem of conceptual definition. This is easy to deal with. A national conference is called for, in which all the chips are down and all cards laid on the table for an extensive discussion of the best way forward. All parties, irrespective of (political) ideology, must be allowed to participate such that whatever decisions are reached will be acceptable to, and binding on all. This way dissent and dysfunctional activities will be minimized and a true atmosphere of peace, stability and security will prevail.

Conclusion

Press freedom has become a very important political issue in Swaziland. Government restrictions and perceived patronizing with regard to the media have obviously not gone down well with some sections of society. In general, the government appears reluctant to hasten the process of democratization both in the area of communication and the general area of governance, thus creating problems for itself. The media need information to function and when they are denied this, they can react in several ways, one of which is being critical of government and its policies - and help paint an unfavourable picture of the country to the outside world.

Politics should not be allowed to feature too prominently in the consideration of press freedom, because it has a way of affecting other aspects of national life. The potential of this in the area of economic growth has been identified. This calls for a very serious reconsideration of policy issues by government.

References

Akinkugbe, O. (1999) ‘Government and Economic Development in Swaziland’, in W. Bass et al (eds) Good Governance and Economic Development (African Development Perspective: Year Book) Munster: LIT.

Thloloe, J., (2000) ‘Don’t Wait Around, Get Drafting,’ The Nation, Dec/Jan.